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ICJ THE SUP PEME COUPT

OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
-oOo-

Pla~~tiff-Responaent,

Case No. 14583

~s.

Defendant-~ppellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATCRE OF THE CASE
Plalntiff-Respondent Centurian Corporation lreferred
to hereinafter as "plaintiff") brought this action alleging
breach, by non-delivery, of an agreement for the purchase and
sale of goods.

Defendant-Respondent Fiberchem, Inc.

(referred

to hereinafter as "defendant") denied the making of the contract
and asserted the defense of alter ego, alleging that the check
ciel.i'Jered to l t was :'or paj'Tllent on the account of plaintiff's
alter ego corporation, Centurian Custom Boats, Inc.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Dlstrict Court for the Third Judicial District in
a~d

:or Salt Lake County, State of Utah, The Honorable Stewart
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E. Hanson presiding, granted plainti::: judccment in the
amount of $3,300.00 together with interest and costs.

Je-

fendant's defense of alter ego was held inapplicable, and
its counterclaim was dismissed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEhL
Defendant seeks an order of this Court vacating and
reversing the judgment rendered by the trial court.

On August l,

l9~c,

?~a~ntiff

Centurian Corporation

delivered to defendant a check in the amount of $3,300.00.
Plaintiff alleged, and through its president, Richard c:ickles,
testified that the check was issued to defendant for the purchase of raw materials used in its boat manufacturing operation.
Defendant denied the existence of a contract :or the
purchase and sale of goods; and through Fred Schwab, its
branch manager, testified that the check was in payment a::
sums due defendant by Centurian Custom Boats, Inc. and was
intended by plaintiff as such.
Centurian Custom Boats, Inc. was organized under the
laws of the State of Utah in October of 1968
11-D).

(R. 106, Ex.

From the time of its organization until its involun-

tary dissolution in 1974, Richard Nickles and his wife

~ar

garet Nickles were the sole shareholders, two of the three
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d1~ecto~s

pri~ary

and the

officers of the company (Ex. 11-D).

?la1ntiff Centurian Corporation was organized under the laws
cf tl"le State of Utah approximately nine months later, in
August of 1969.

Richard Nickles and his wife Margaret, to-

;ethe.::- w1 th her father, l'lilliam Kaiser, were the sole share~olde:cs

fc:Gm ti-ce time of ir.coq:oration through the period

naterial to th1s cause.
~ate~~al

the

~i~es

pri~ar;

as

t~o

executi~e

.lr. and Brs. Nickles served at all

of the three directors, and served as
officers of the corporation (Ex. 12-D).

:orm·:1encing some tir.,e in late 1968 or early 1969, the
defendant, a wholesaler in materials used in boat manufactur-ng, sold

~aw

materials to Centurian Custom Boats, Inc.

This

relat1onship between Fiberchem, Inc. as a supplier of raw materials and Centurian Custom Boats, Inc. and/or Centurian
Corporation as purchasers existed until November of 1973 when
Centurian Corporation made its last purchase.
Plaintiff maintains that it purchased no raw materials from defendant until the litigated transaction of August
l, 1973, and that all prior purchases were made by Centurian
Custom Boats,

Inc.

Both plaintiff and defendant, however,

maintained a .::limsy and often inconsistent regard for the
separation of the corporations as evidenced by invoices for
materials designated at one time Centurian Corporation and at
other times Centurian custom Boats, Inc.

(Exs. 23-25-D).

The

statement of accounts was maintained by defendant in the name
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of Centurian Custom Boats, Inc., although defendant was not
aware until the filing of this action that two corporatlons
actually existed.
While it was contested below as to which corporation
was actually purchasing the raw materials, the destructlon
of the boat manufacturing facility at 620 Wilnington Avenue,
Salt Lake City, in January of 1972, brought an end to all
purchases for a period of one year

(£x. 8-P).

As of July 13, 1973, Centurian
owed to

defenda~t

C~stom

Boats, Inc.

::-.e s ~" of $3,313.15 on open account for

the purchase of raw materials, primarily resins, coatings and
fiberglass mats (Ex. 8-P).

On August 1, 1973, plaintiff Cen-

turian Corporation issued defendant a check in the amount of
$3,300.00 which defendant applied to the account of Centurlan
Custom Boats, Inc. to extinguish a long delinquent account
(Ex. 8-P).

Plaintiff, through Richard Nickles, testified

that the check was issued for the purchase of raw materials
which were never delivered by defendant.

In November of 1973,

notwithstanding the failure of delivery on the alleged Auc;;Jst
1 transaction, plaintiff purchased raw materials from defendant totalling $851.95 (Ex. 5-P) on a
its check.

c.o.D.

basis and issued

On January 25, 1974, plaintiff made vague demand

on defendant, presumably for the delivery of the goods specified in the August 1, 1973 transaction, although its written
demand does not specify the goods in question (Ex. 13-D).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ARGUMENT
I

THE TP,I;..L COURT ERRED Ill GRA:JTING JUDGMENT TO
PL.;::::;TIFF A1\D I:J DENYING DEFENDANT'S DEFENSE
OF ALTER EGO.

This case involves the believability of witnesses,
one ?reduced by the plaintiff, Richard Nickles, and one by
the

~e.:endant,

Fred Schwab.

The 'lariances in testimony are

so disparate as to cast grave doubt on the veracity of one
or the other.

But this matter exceeds the formal believabil-

ity of either on the question of whether a discussion took
place forming a contract, but goes further and involves the
conduct, actions and activities of two corporations, Centurian
Corporatic~

and Centurian Custom Boats, Inc., both controlled

by Richard Nickles.

If, on the record and as a consequence

of the trial court's findings that a contract was made, this
Court cannot infringe the providence of the trier of fact,
then the issue of alter ego and offset can be applied.

That

is that defendant has an admitted offset in the amount of
$3,300.00 against Centurian Custom Boats, Inc., which corporation is the alter ego of plaintiff and must be offset against
any sum due the plaintiff.
The trial court's judgment for plaintiff was grounded
on three principal findings:

(l)

that a contract existed

between plaintiff and defendant for the purchase and sale of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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goods;

(2) that the contract was breached by defendant's

failure to deliver those goods; and

(3)

that defendant, be-

cause of the grounds specified by the trial court in its
memorandum decision (R. 55), could not assert a defense of
alter ego and corresponding offset.
Defendant, throughout the proceedings below, denied
the making of the August 1, 1973 contract for the purchase
and sale of goods and presented substantial evidence that Centurian Corporatiol"' 3.nd

~enturian

all practical purposes

~~e

alter ego of each.

T~e

Custom Boats, Inc. were for

same entity, the corresponding

trial court concluded the inapplica-

bility of the alter ego defense on four grounds which are
either erroneous conclusions of law or irrelevant matters
bearing on the legal issues of its defense.
A.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY FOUND NO EVIDEtlCE

OF TRICKERY OR FRAUD AND FURTHER ERRONEOUSLY HELD
THAT DEFENDANT MUST ESTABLISH TRICKERY OR FFAUD E<
ORDER TO ASSERT A DEFENSE OF ALTER EGO.
There is substantial evidence in the record to derr.onstrate that plaintiff, by and through Richard Nickles, its
chief executive officer, has, since its incept~on, used the
two corporate entities, Centurian Custom Boats, Inc. and Centurian Corporation to avoid creditors, liability, and in general to protect its assets.

There is substantial evidence to

demonstrate that plaintiff has engaged in a course of conduct
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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calc -1la te~l to a·/old the ;:;a:;ment of the debt due defendant
~anipulation o~

through the

the two corporations.

Centurian Corporation asserted throughout the trial
below that prior to the
~anu~acturing

or

~aterlals

f~re

which destroyed its Wilmington

plant ln 2anuary of 1972, it purchased no goods
~rom

defendant, Slnce it was only a holding com-

?an; which elther held real estate or purchased molds which
it

lease~

testi~ied,

that

to Centurian Custom Boats, Inc.

Richard Nickles

although no documentary evidence was introduced,

cor~orate

formalities were maintained by the corporations.

The record of this case, together with the record of two other
proceedings involving Centurian Corporation, shows that in
fact clickles represents the relationship between the corporations to suit the purposes of the particular case, and in
this case his purpose was to defeat a just obligation that was
owed to defendant.
~ickles

testified that Centurian Corporation was or-

ganized to hold real estate in 1969 (R. 111) and that in 1970
it ?urchased molds from third parties and leased those molds
to Centurian CustoM Boats, Inc.
t~een

(R. 112).

All leases be-

the companies were lost in a fire in January, 1972, al-

though Nickles testified that Centurian Corporation maintained
lts offices at his home located elsewhere.

Nickles further

testifled that Centurian Corporation did not manufacture,
J:.)rocluce or own boats, that it bought no raw materials from
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defendant at any time prior to August 1, 1973.

In short,

Centurian Corporation had no dealings with defendant.
In another action, Scantlin v. Centurian Corporation, the record of which was admitted in this action as
Exhibit 16-D, Nickles testified that Centurian Corporation
in fact produced 85 to 90 boats in 1971 (Nickles deposition
at 11, Ex. 16-D), and that Centurian Custom Boats manufactured no boats in 1971 but only acted as the sales agent for
Centurian Corporation.

At the trial below Nickles explained

this contradiction by saying that the reporter in the Scantlin
case got the two companies mixed up, "an easy thing to do"
(R. 131).
In proceedings in the Federal District Court for the
District of Utah, Central Division,

(Centurian Corporation v.

Transwestern General Agency, Civ. No. C-263, 1973), Centurian
Corporation brought an action against its insurance carriers
for the destruction of the manufacturing plant at 620 Hilmington and its contents (R. 120-128).

The affidavit o:

Richard Nickles (Ex. 15-D) in support of Centurian Corporation's claim states that from August of 1969 until the fire
in January of 1972, Centurian Corporation manufactured boats.
No mention is made of Centurian Custom Boats, Inc. and Centurian Custom Boats, Inc. made no claim for insurance proceeds.

In the complaint filed in that proceeding (Ex. 22-D),

plaintiff attached as an exhibit its accounts payable through
-8-
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Se~~e~ce~

~0,

19-l, and detailed on the exhiblt iz a

t~!

o;r-,ce c·.v_:_;--.g to de::endant in the amount of $4,191. OS fo:c £.-' •.:;:;case a:: ra·.-.· I':'.ate:cials, whlch swns corresponc to sum detailed
en de::endant's statement to Centurian Custom Boats,
(Ex.

3-?) •

Again,

Inc.

neither Nickles nor his wife could make

an; satls::actory explanation of the contradictions oi the
tes~i~cny

e:cal
and

at thls t:cial and the a::fidavits filed in the ::ed-

co~::t

~rcceecii:1g,

acco~ntant

were confused

(R. 133).

At the very least,

p::.ainti:::•s exhibit to its complaint (Ex.

hc<:e·:e.::,

sti -=·.1tes an
chases,

but said in ef:ect that thei.:: lav:yers

a~"ission

22-G)

con-

of liability to defendant for

::cr whlch the $3,300.00 was paid.
~e:endant

would also refer the Court to Ex. 20-D, an

additional affidavit made by Nickles

~:1

the federal court ac-

tion, whe:celn a detailed list of the material lost in the
fi:ce is attached.

Again, Centurian Corporation is shown as

the owne:c of materials used in the manufacture of boats. The
contradlction between the testimony of Nickles at the trial
in

t~is

~atter

and the other proceedings is striking and can-

net be :cesolved, except that on one or more occaslons the
test~~0nj

was

~lth

inacc~~ate.

:cespect to plaintiff's dealings with defendant,

the :cecc:cci telow makes clear the following:
:nvoices we:ce labeled both Centurian Corporation
and :ent~rian Scats,

Inc. and were received without objection
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or request for clarification by plaintiff
B.

Defenda~t

(Exs. 23-25-D).

received at least one check drawn on

the account of Centurian Corporation paying for purchases of
raw materials (Ex. 18-D) prior to the fire in January, 1972.

c.

Fred Schwab, branch manager of defendant, did

not know of the existence of the two corporations and assu.";',ed
that he was dealing with one entity (R. 185).
D.

Richard

~ickles

admitted that confusion often

resulted from the similarity of the names of the two companies {R. 131).
This Court,

~~

~ne

26 Utah 2d 88, 485 2.2d 667

case of Chatterlev v. Omnico, Inc.,
(1971), held that one corporation

was the alter ego of another and enforced a wage claim
against the parent corporation incurred by its subsidiary.
This Court stated that it would disregard the corporate fietion without a showing of fraud or trickery when considerations
of justice so required.

At page 670 of the Omnico decision,

this Court stated:
In this situation the consideration of
justice which so requires is simply that a
controlling corporation such as Omnico should
not be permitted to manage and operate a business from which it stands to gain whatever
profit may be made, have the advantage of the
efforts of those who serve it, and then use
the nomenclature of another corporation as a
facade to insulate it from responsibility for
paying for such services.
While plaintiff Centurian Corporation is not the parent of
Centurian Custom Boats, Inc., the similarities to rm.nico 3re
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, -10administered by the Utah State Library.
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strikl~g

Slnce there is common ownership, benefit and con-

trol of beth

cor~orations.

~:ickles

testified, as did his wife f.largaret, in ex-

?lanation of checks written to defendant prior to January,
19-:-2, that Centurian Corporation would commonly make loans
to Centurlan Custom Boats, Inc.
,~luced
loa~s,

However, plaintiff intro-

::otf:i:--.; at the trial to demonstrate the formalities of
?ro~issory

notes, ledger entries or minutes.

iently, all such records were destroyed in the fire
~ickles

Conven(R. 146).

also testified that Centurian Corporation

was the financing arm of Centurian Custom Boats in that it
held the molds and leased them to Custom Boats (R. 154-55).
:: that is true, all the assets of the operation, together
with the insurance proceeds were left in the plaintiff Cent;.Jrlan Corporation and Centurian Custom Boats, Inc. was left
as a bankrupt and dissolved corporate shell, the result of
which is that defendant, like the wage claimant in Ornnico,
would be left with a useless judgment.
The trial court, while admitting and hearing the evidence, held that the Ornnico decision required evidence of
fraud or trickery which it found to be absent in this action.
The Omnico decision does not so require, but requires a merger of corporate identity resulting in injustice to creditors.
Defendant met that burden at trial.
The trial court found and held as a bar to defendant's
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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claim of alter ego and course of dealing defendant's knowledge that Centurian Custom Boats, Inc. had ceased doing
business as of January, 1972.

This finding is irrelevant

to the issues of the lawsuit.

Fred Schwab testified that

he was not aware two corporations were in existence.
The equitable doctrine of alter ego, or the piercing of the corporate veil, was developed very early by the
courts to combat abuses of corporations.
corporate status is

t~a~sactional;

The disregard of

that is, it does not op-

erate to dissolve the corporation, rather it binds either a
shareholder or another corporation to its acts.

The remedy

is equitable and therefore both a trial court and appellate
court have great latitude and discretion in finding fact and
formulating a remedy.

See Fletcher, Corporations

(Perm. Ed.)

§ 41 et seq.; O'Neal, Close Corporations (Perm. Ed.)

s

1 et

seq.; 46 ALR 3d 428.
This Court is not unfamiliar with the equitable doctrine and has decided a number of cases dealing with the disregard of corporateness or alter ego.

While the Ornnico de-

cision, supra, is the nearest in point, the cases of Omoss v.
Bennion, 18 Utah 2d 251, 420 P.2d 47

(1966); Stine v. Girola,

9 Utah 2d 22, 337 P.2d 62 (1959); Western Securities Co. v.
Spiro, 62 Utah 623, 221 P. 856 (1923)

look at the transactlon

course of dealing involved and do not require fraud or trickery nor hold the aggrieved party to duties arising, if at all
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may
contain errors.
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a~

~~~,

o,J~

~ot

1~

equity.

In \·;estern Securities Co. v. Spiro, supra, the defen~~nt

i~

~laintiff
~ol~e~.

:he

an action to recover on notes, asserted that the
corporation was the alter ego of its sole

The trial court agreed, and this Court affirmed.

e~~~ence

hcl~e~

~sed

:c~~~~~cled

:-.ot
~r.

i~

share-

adduced at that trial showed that the sharet~e

corporation for his personal business and

assets and funds.

The opinion of the court speaks

ter71.s of fra·.1d or trickery but in terms of real party

~~te~e3t

~he

as disregarding the corporate entity.
trial court below, by its denial of the defense

~~no~es

the equitable nature of the relief requested and the

con~~ct

of the parties, and in particular the perfidious use

c:

Cent~rian

C~stom

Boats, Inc. by the plaintiff.

Defendant

car. flnd no cases or statutory authority supporting the propositlon that it had a duty to ascertain the existence of two
cor~orat~ons.

The thrust of the equitable doctrine of alter

ego and piercing corporate veils is that of the conduct of
the partles, the real intent, the real party in interest and
i:J co=-:--.g equi t:l.
II

THE

TRI.~

COCRT'S FINDINGS THAT A CONTRACT WAS

;:::;-:EP.ED INTO FOR THE PURCHASE AND SALE OF GOODS
?r>?

:·;HICH THE CHECK WAS CONSIDERATION IS NOT SUP-

?C?T:C:::J BY THE E'JI:JE:JCE.
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The trial court found that a contract for the purchase and sale of raw materials in the amount of $3,300.00
was made by and between plaintiff and defendant.

Richard

Nickles testified that after the fire which destroyed the
manufacturing operation conducted by Centurian Custom Boats,
Inc., Centurian Corporation decided to enter that business
and engage in manufacturing.

Notably that was after Centur-

ian Corporation filed a claim for all the proceeds under the
fire insurance policies.
tacted Fred Schwab

In any event, he alleged he con-

re~arding

the purchase, and a decision

was made as to prices and =ornrnodities.

The only evidence

aside from the testimony of Nickles is the check voucher produced at the trial by plaintiff containing a list of goods
adding up to approximately $3,300.00, a coincidental figure
with what was owed to defendant.

Nickles testified that af-

ter a period of time he brought the action for defendant's
failure to deliver.
Fred Schwab, the branch manager at Fiberchern, tells
an entirely different version.

Schwab testified that from the

time of the fire until July of 1973, he made every reasonable
attempt to collect the $3,300.00 owed by Centurian Custom
Boats to defendant.

Schwab stated that due to the reported

fire and financial difficulties described by Nickles, the
head office finally decided to give up collection attempts as
fruitless and write the debt off.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided
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3=~wab,

j~st p~~cr tc Au~ust l,

1973, had renewed
:Clickles

tole Schwab that he ·.-:auld r-;ay· the debt if Schwab would "dum~:J

an in?oicen

(?.

182).

~his

Schwab refused to do.

t!ickles

finall; acq~iesced, and on Aug~st l, 1973, delivered a check
~o

de:enGan~'s

o::ice.

Sc~wab

testified that there was

no

-2iscussion cf rr.aterials and the check v.·as payment on account.
~s

~a~

3s

he knew,

Cent~ria~ Corporation manufactured the Cen-

t'.Jl·lar. Boat and there \vas one business.

:Jickles' testimony

when laid agair.st Schwab's is either believable or it is not.
Both cannot be truthful in their testimony.

Apparently in

the face of constant impeachment, Richard Nickles' prior con~iction

for felonious mail fraud

chose to believe

(R. 140), the trial court

~ickles.

Defendant elsewhere at the trial demonstrated that
::ickles r:ot only had r:10ti·o1e to hide the truth, but the means
by which Nickles utilized the corporations not only in this
action but in the prior actions as well.
words, but deliberately chosen.
the

sco~e

These are harsh

Defendant is well aware of

of review this Court may exercise in reviewing the

findincs of the trial court but must urge that the testimony
of Richard Nickles was riddled with inconsistencies both
lnternally and when viewed against his prior testimony, to
which defendant has directed the Court's attention.

There

cu.n be no balance or harmony struck between the testimony of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the two men.

The trial court, in view of the record in

matter, found the making of the contract

th~s

erroneousl~.

CONCLUSION
Defendant is entitled to an order of this Court vaeating the judgment reached herein and for whatever further
relief or proceedings this Court deems proper.

R~ec ~~j~,submi

CAR &/U~)
Mi ael l".
225 South
Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for DefendantAppellant
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